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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.

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(Editor's Note: The following excerpt is from the 9/11 Commission, statement of Rohan Gunaratna. To review his statement in its entirety, please click on link following excerpt. Hyperlink for the Commission also follows excerpt.)

Third public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Statement of Rohan Gunaratna to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

July 9, 2003

The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda

... Current Situation:

In response to the high threat to Al Qaeda, the group is becoming more creative and lethal. The group is adapting dual technologies - airplanes, commercially available chemicals, agricultural fertilizers, liquid petroleum gas, and

liquid nitrogen gas - as its new weapons. The group is also searching for new weapons such as chemical and biological agents especially contact poisons easy to conceal and breach security. Both Osama's statement in February 2003 "think intelligently and kill the American's secretly and in May 2003, Sheikh Nasr bin Hamid al Fahd's fatwa legitimizing the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Although an attempt to pervert Islam, it is likely that the Saudi Sheik presented Koranic justifications, a requirement in Islam, prelude to an attack. Reflecting the existing and emerging threat, Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of the British Security Services (MI5) said in London on July 17, 2003, that a terrorist attack on a Western city using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) technology is "only a matter of time. She added: "We know that renegade scientists have cooperated with al Qaeda and provided them with some of the knowledge they need to develop these weapons." The Al Qaeda associate group - the Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) - successfully developed ricin, one of the contact poisons found in the Al Qaeda manuals and its rudimentary manufacturing apparatus in London in January 2003. The ricin network in Europe, especially in London, Manchester, East Anglia and Edinburgh in the UK, worked together with Al Qaeda experts in the Pankishi Gorge in Georgia, the border of Chechnya. . .

http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_gunaratna.htm

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

<http://www.9-11commission.gov/>

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Revisions to Patterns of Global Terrorism Released

A review of the 2003 edition of "Patterns of Global Terrorism" determined that the data in the report was incomplete and in some cases incorrect. The corrected [Year in Review](#), [Appendix A](#), and [Appendix G](#) are now available. Numbers in the text, specifically numbers of killed and wounded, will be revised to reflect the corrected Appendices. [\[Remarks\]](#) by Secretary Powell [DSL/Cable dial-up-modem audio](#)] [\[Remarks\]](#) by Ambassador Black and Director Brennan]

<http://www.state.gov/>

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New York Times

June 23, 2004

U.S. To Offer North Korea Incentives In Nuclear Talks

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, June 22 - President Bush has authorized a team of American negotiators to offer North Korea, in talks in Beijing on Thursday, a new but highly conditional set of incentives to give up its nuclear weapons programs the way Libya did late last year, according to senior administration officials.

The proposal would be the first significant, detailed overture to North Korea since Mr. Bush took office three years ago.

Under the plan, outlined by American officials on Tuesday evening, in response to pressure from China and American allies in Asia, the aid would begin flowing immediately after a commitment by Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, to dismantle his plutonium and uranium weapons programs. In return, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea would immediately begin sending tens of thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil every month, and Washington would offer a "provisional" guarantee not to invade the country or seek to topple Mr. Kim's government.

It would also begin direct talks about lifting a broad array of American economic sanctions that have been in place against North Korea for more than half a century, and providing longer-term energy aid and retraining of nuclear scientists.

But Mr. Kim would have only three months, what the officials call a "preparatory period of dismantlement," to seal and shut the North Korean nuclear facilities, similar to what Libya committed to late last year. After that, Mr. Bush's aides say, the continuation of the oil and the talks would depend on North Korea giving international inspectors

access to suspected nuclear sites, and meeting a series of deadlines for disclosing the full nature of its facilities, disabling and dismantling them, and then shipping them out of the country, as Libya did.

"Our allies have been telling us that they think Kim Jong Il is ready for a test of his intentions," one of Mr. Bush's most senior national security aides said in a interview on Tuesday night. "So we are prepared to offer them a strategic choice." Another senior aide said, "They may say no - and in that case they will have failed the test." Administration officials said they expected the North Koreans to take any offers back to Pyongyang, and that it could be weeks or longer before an answer.

Mr. Bush has been under rising criticism - from South Korea, China, Russia and most recently his presumptive Democratic opponent, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts - for failing to make a serious offer to the North Koreans since coming into office. While intelligence agencies are still arguing with each other about what progress North Korea's two nuclear programs have made in the past few years, a consensus is developing that, in the past year, the country has probably fabricated enough plutonium fuel to make six or seven new nuclear weapons, and there is still unconfirmed evidence, gathered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, that the North may have shipped raw uranium to Libya for its bomb project.

By setting a three-month grace period, Mr. Bush's aides say they are trying to correct what they view as major flaws in the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement with North Korea that President Bill Clinton signed, but which has been abandoned. Under that agreement, North Korea never had to ship its plutonium fuel out of the country, and it continued to receive fuel oil and other aid while, intelligence officials assert, it started a second, secret program to build bombs out of uranium fuel, with help from a clandestine network built by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear chief.

Officials from several Asian allies, who began to hear about the plan on Tuesday in Beijing, said they welcomed it - but they questioned whether it would be enough to induce Mr. Kim to give up the one program that gives his desperate country leverage over its far more powerful neighbors. "They probably would reject even a better offer, figuring that after the election they have a chance of dealing with someone other than George Bush," said one senior Asian official who has been urging the White House to make an offer to the North. "And, of course, they can use the extra time to work on making more bomb fuel, if they haven't finished that process already."

Asked Tuesday night why the North Koreans should respond before they see whether Mr. Bush has been re-elected, or whether they will be dealing with a Democrat who has promised one-on-one talks, one of Mr. Bush's aides said, "Maybe they won't." But if they fail to agree, he said, "they will have to weigh the effect on the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Russians and the Chinese," all of whom are potential sources of energy, food and investment.

Under the offer, those four countries - but not the United States - would provide the North with heavy fuel oil roughly equivalent to the 45,000 tons the United States was sending to the country under the 1994 agreement. The United States halted those shipments 18 months ago when it confronted North Korea with evidence about the uranium program.

Elements of the new proposal have been floated before - including a written security guarantee - but never with this specificity, with a timetable or promise of immediate aid. But several hawks in the administration are opposed to making what one senior State Department official called "a much more expansive offer," and both American and Asian officials fear that North Korea could reject it as insufficient.

Several outside experts said they believed that the North Koreans now think they have the upper hand in the negotiations, partly because South Korea has agreed to direct talks on military issues and because China, which is organizing the negotiations in Beijing, has provided the North with millions of dollars in fuel and other goods to keep talking.

"The North Koreans don't feel under any pressure to make concessions right now because they feel the United States is not in a position to take military action, and not in a position to walk away," said Gary Samore, who ran the nonproliferation office of the National Security Council under Mr. Clinton and is now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "They are in a strange position; they are being paid by the Chinese to talk."

In public, Mr. Bush talks about confronting North Korea with a unified view from the five nations on the other side of the table: the United States, South Korea, Russia, China and Japan. But it was not until the past few days - with signs that the unity of that group might be cracking - that he agreed to put what one administration official called "meat on the bones" of its offer.

South Korea, impatient with Mr. Bush, has made its own series of overtures to North Korea. Japan has agreed to compensate North Korea for releasing the children of Japanese who were kidnapped years ago. China has publicly questioned the American evidence that the North has a separate uranium program, though administration officials say that, in private, the Chinese concede they, too, believe the North is taking two paths to building bombs, and has been trying to simplify the talks to get Washington to return to a freeze of the nuclear program.

Mr. Bush has rejected that approach, saying a freeze would not solve the problem, his aides say. He is demanding a Libya-like dismantlement, and will be speaking in the next few days to leaders of the countries involved in the negotiations, one of his most senior aides said, "to urge them to urge the North" to take the deal.

Like Iraq, North Korea has been a subject of constant division and argument within the Bush administration, almost since the day the president took office. Many in the State Department urged the White House to build on talks Mr. Clinton was pursuing in 2000, including discussions of removing North Korea from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. Hawks in the administration - from the vice president's office to the Pentagon - opposed any talks at all, saying there was no reason to believe that the North Koreans would abide by a new agreement after violating the 1994 accord. (North Korea charged that Congress never fulfilled its commitments to provide all the oil promised under that agreement.)

Mr. Bush, while refusing direct talks with North Korea, began six-party talks to put pressure on the North from its closest neighbors, but so far the sessions have made no concrete progress. Frustrated, the allies have for months been urging Mr. Bush to make what one Chinese diplomat called "a serious offer, not a vague statement that if the North Koreans disarm, something good might happen."

Mr. Bush's aides say they are now doing that - though Mr. Kerry argued in an interview last month that if the White House had seriously engaged with North Korea early in Mr. Bush's presidency, the North might not have converted its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into bomb fuel. White House officials have said that that position is naïve, and that North Korea was intent on cheating on its old agreement.

With the new offer, Mr. Bush has retreated on one major point: after insisting a year ago that the allies cut off oil to North Korea, he has now agreed to allow a resumption of oil shipments - though not American oil - before the country actually dismantles anything. But because the shipments would last only for three months if the North reneged on any part of its disarmament pledge, Mr. Bush's aides argue that there would be little at risk.

It may not get that far. The kind of disclosure Mr. Bush is pressing North Korea to make would involve an admission that the secret uranium program exists - something the Americans say the North admitted to in October 2002, but have since denied. It would require revealing, then opening, secret nuclear sites. And it would require, in the end, trusting that the benefits would continue to flow even after all the country's nuclear materials have been shipped out of the country.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/politics/23kore.html?hp>

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Washington Times

June 23, 2004

Pg. 15

Embassy Row

Pakistan Nukes Safe

By James Morrison

Pakistan has secured its nuclear arsenal to protect the weapons from nuclear smugglers, Pakistani Ambassador Ashraf Jehangir Qazi said yesterday.

"We have adopted an effective command-and-control system to ensure that our nuclear weapons do not fall into the wrong hands," he told a conference on nuclear nonproliferation in Washington.

Mr. Qazi also said Pakistan has adopted tight measures to prevent the spread of nuclear-weapons technology.

Earlier this year, Pakistan was embarrassed by the revelations that the country's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, headed a secret network that sold nuclear technology. He confessed to illegal deals with Iran, Libya and North Korea.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/embassy.htm>

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New York Times

June 24, 2004

North Korea Is Studying Softer Stance From The U.S.

By Joseph Kahn

BEIJING, June 23 — The United States presented North Korea with a proposal on Wednesday for phasing out its nuclear program in exchange for aid and security guarantees, as senior Bush administration officials acknowledged that they were softening their hard-line stance in negotiations with North Korea.

James A. Kelly, the chief American negotiator, presented a seven-page proposal to his North Korean counterparts on the opening day of six-nation nuclear talks in Beijing, a senior administration official said, adding that "it was time to start getting specific" in the so-far inconclusive negotiations.

American officials said North Korea rebuffed an invitation on Wednesday to hold a private meeting during the six-nation talks to discuss the proposal in more detail. The North Korea delegation, which put forward its own plan at the talks, had no immediate reaction to the American offer.

The talks, the third round of negotiations involving China, Japan, South Korea and Russia as well as the United States and North Korea, are expected to continue through Friday. Despite the American offer, which had been anticipated, expectations for achieving a breakthrough at this round remain modest.

Under the American plan, North Korea would have to fully disclose its nuclear activities, submit to inspections and pledge to begin eliminating nuclear programs after a "preparatory period" of three months.

In exchange, the government of Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, would receive shipments of heavy fuel oil to meet its energy needs, gain a "provisional security guarantee" from the United States and see the lifting of some sanctions.

The proposal, which American officials said was first presented to them by South Korea earlier this month and was modified in Washington, is a combination of ideas put forward in earlier rounds of talks.

Administration officials described the proposal they made "as more tangible and more specific" than any offered in the past, and expressed cautious optimism that the talks "were headed in a new direction" now that there was a firm proposal on the table.

The administration appears to have eased its opposition to engaging in detailed talks with North Korea, which President Bush once labeled a member of an "axis of evil." Last summer, when negotiations first got under way, Mr. Bush said that providing any benefits to North Korea before it completely abandoned its nuclear program would be like submitting to blackmail.

But as the talks progressed, Asian diplomats argued that the North Koreans were willing to engage in substantive negotiations and to discard their weapons program for the right incentives. China, South Korea and Japan have all urged the United States to bring a concrete proposal to the latest round or risk being seen as recalcitrant.

"We did think it was a good time to offer a proposal because colleagues and allies urged us to do so," one administration official said.

Another American official said China had persuaded the United States that it was worth supporting economic change in North Korea, noting that Mr. Kim had undertaken some experiments with market reforms that deserved support.

A senior administration official emphasized that the new plan did not require North Korea to accept the precise formula for resolving the standoff — "the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of its nuclear program — that the administration had insisted was its bottom line in any agreement. In previous rounds, the same official had suggested that North Korea would have to agree to that wording before there could be even discussions of any benefits it might receive.

The official said the formula, known by its initials C.V.I.D., was still the goal of the United States. But he said the repetition of that demand and the suggestion that North Korea had to give up its nuclear program before it could expect benefits had inflamed sensibilities at earlier rounds.

"C.V.I.D. is a way of describing the end of the process but not the only way of describing the process," the official said. "It's not necessary to use that term." Still, the prospects for a breakthrough seemed limited because of still substantial differences between the American and North Korea positions.

A Bush administration official said that in the planning sessions held before the formal opening of the talks, the North Korean negotiators continued to deny that they had a program to enrich uranium to make nuclear fuel in addition to a plutonium program, which the North has acknowledged having.

The American allegation that North Korea has a secret uranium enrichment program, first broached in 2002, was the original cause of the current standoff, and Bush administration officials say they have gathered more evidence since that time to support the accusation.

The new American plan requires North Korea to declare all of its nuclear programs, "including all uranium enrichment activities," as a first step. American officials said that addressing the enrichment program was an indispensable part of their plan.

North Korea also seems likely to push for a considerably longer timetable for phasing out its weapons program than the United States has proposed, in part to receive more benefits along the way.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/international/asia/24KORE.html>

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Washington Times

June 24, 2004

Pg. 17

U.S. Device Seen At Nuclear Site

VIENNA, Austria — A radiation-monitoring device spotted in Iran at a razed site where Washington suspects that Iran conducted covert atomic bomb-related research was made in the United States and sold directly to Tehran, sources said.

A Western diplomat and an independent nuclear scientist who follow the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency said the radiation detection device — called a "whole body counter" — was identified as having been made by the Connecticut-based firm Canberra Industries Inc. It was seen at Lavizan, near a military installation in Tehran.

The counter was sold directly to a university or hospital in Iran in the early 1990s with a U.S. export license.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/worldscene.htm>

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Washington Post

June 24, 2004

Pg. 25

A Critical Nuclear Moment

By Brent Scowcroft

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has just rebuked Iran for failing to cooperate fully with international inspectors who are examining whether Tehran is meeting its nonproliferation commitments.

How concerned should we be about this development? What does it mean? By its own admission, Iran has been taking steps to develop the capability to enrich uranium, one of the two methods used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. While Iran says its activities are solely for peaceful production of nuclear power and are permitted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, once enrichment capability exists, a major barrier to producing a nuclear weapon virtually vanishes. The IAEA condemnation is an indication that the world may be on the verge of a major breakdown of the nonproliferation regime, to say nothing of a huge new source of instability in a critically important region.

The absence of an effective international response to North Korean efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability may already have resulted in the entry of another country into the ranks of nuclear-capable powers. North Korea not only can be presumed to have reprocessed enough plutonium this year for an additional six to eight nuclear weapons, it reportedly also is working on a uranium enrichment capability to accompany its existing ability to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel rods.

Should Iran now be permitted to develop the capability to enrich uranium, it is almost impossible to imagine that other countries could be dissuaded from creating their own enrichment capabilities and consequently the capacity to produce weapons-grade material for nuclear weapons.

We are at a critical moment. Are we serious in our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, or will we watch the world descend into a maelstrom where weapons-grade nuclear material is plentiful and unimaginable destructive capability is available to any country or group with a grudge against society?

Staring into that abyss should stir us to action. What can we do? The United States, Britain, France and Germany have already shown an encouraging, if insufficient, degree of cooperation with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. Russia has been the principal source of assistance in the development of Iranian nuclear power. But Russia has already informed Iran that it would expect spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr plant to be returned to Russia, appearing to indicate that it too has no interest in allowing Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

This situation should allow these five powers to deepen their cooperation to the point of presenting a united front to Iran. They could announce that they would be prepared to give Iran full assistance in developing nuclear power generation capability, under appropriate safeguards. They could offer to guarantee an adequate supply of nuclear fuel for Iranian power reactors at favorable rates and to remove spent nuclear fuel from Iran. In return, Iran would be required to forswear any attempt either to enrich uranium or to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

It must be acknowledged that this would be a difficult offer for the United States to make, requiring it to put aside its serious concerns about a range of other objectionable Iranian behavior. But the nonproliferation stakes are so great that they warrant addressing this issue separately.

If Iran is sincere in its protestations that it seeks nuclear energy only for power generation, this would be by far the most efficient and economical way for it to reach that goal. Agreement could also pave the way for discussions on broader issues of concern among the parties, including security questions.

Should Iran reject such an offer, it would be clear that its objective is the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In that event, the issue should be taken to the U.N. Security Council, and the most serious forms of sanction and isolation should be applied.

But while Iran is an urgent matter, we will not succeed in dealing with it if we treat it as an isolated case. Like Iran, Brazil has announced its intention to construct a uranium enrichment facility. If we give Brasilia a pass at the same time that we are bearing down on Tehran, it not only will send exactly the wrong message to would-be proliferators but will sharply diminish any prospects for success with Iran.

Acquiescing in the Brazilian enrichment program would have the effect of dividing nuclear power aspirants into good guys and bad. Such an approach would provide a powerful weapon to Iran as it seeks to rally international support for its "peaceful" nuclear program and split us from the Europeans and the Russians.

Our goal instead should be to delegitimize the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities to any country, because these capabilities are the linchpin of any program to develop nuclear weapons.

Put simply, the way Brazil is dealt with could prove to be one of the keys to dealing with the Iranian nuclear problem, either by persuading Tehran to abandon its nuclear weapon ambitions or by rallying the international community to crack down on Iran if it does not. We therefore should make the same offer to Brazil as to Iran and make clear the consequences if Brazil turns down that offer.

These steps are certainly no substitute for a carefully thought-out general program to enhance the safeguards of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and otherwise improve the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime. But if we do not act swiftly and decisively now, attempts to provide a future comprehensive framework will be worse than fruitless. Now is the moment of truth.

The writer was national security adviser to presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. He is president of the Forum for International Policy.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1027-2004Jun23.html>

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New York Times

June 24, 2004

News Analysis

About-Face On North Korea: Allies Helped

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, June 23 — President Bush's concrete offer to cajole North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program is a turning point for an administration previously caught between two conflicting approaches to one of the world's most isolated, impoverished and dangerous nations.

One camp, encompassing many in the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney's office, has argued for further isolating North Korea's government and pressing for its collapse. Another, rooted in the State Department and some corners of the National Security Council, has said that Kim Jong Il, North Korea's leader, should be put to the test, given a serious offer that lays out what kind of benefits would flow if he gave up an expanding nuclear program. For now, that camp has won the day.

Mr. Bush selected his course because he had little choice: his Asian allies, picking up signals that the government of Mr. Kim may finally be willing to make a deal, were quietly beginning to negotiate a separate peace.

But perhaps as notable as Mr. Bush's turnabout is what it is missing: the kind of threats that surrounded his confrontation with Saddam Hussein last year. Though American intelligence agencies have warned Mr. Bush that North Korea is probably putting the finishing touches on six or more nuclear weapons, the president has sounded almost no public warnings about the threat the country poses, or given voice to the fear that it could sell its excess nuclear technology to terrorists or other states. While the administration's offer of assistance carries a three-month expiration date, the proposal sets no enforcement deadlines for North Korea to disarm.

There is no echo of the threat repeated so often prior to the Iraq war, no suggestion that if North Korea refuses to disarm, Mr. Bush will lead an alliance to make it disarm. There is no appetite in Asia or in the White House for such a risk, and the North Koreans know that.

Mr. Bush's senior advisers have insisted all along that the Korean challenge requires a very different strategy. They acknowledge that there are no good military options if North Korea chooses to keep making weapons — only the threat of more of the isolation the country has suffered but survived for half a century.

But in private, some officials also acknowledge that America's troubles in Iraq have changed the global politics of nuclear disarmament. For the benefit of this country's allies, they said, Mr. Bush had to come up with a serious offer — even one laden with conditions for full disclosure, full dismantlement and full inspections that they expect North Korea will reject.

"My hunch is that it's going to be very hard to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons," no matter how good the offer, said Kurt Campbell, a former senior Pentagon official during the Clinton administration. He was speaking at a conference on proliferation challenges that was taking place here just as the administration was changing course. "But we need to try," he said, "because if things get unpleasant, we will need to demonstrate to the allies that the diplomatic effort was serious."

Mr. Bush appears to have been pushed by those allies, at least according to the accounts offered up by Asian officials — and confirmed by some but not all — of their American counterparts.

For months, diplomats from China, Japan and South Korea have worried that the talks with North Korea were going nowhere, and they have described Mr. Kim and Mr. Bush as equally stubborn.

In meeting after meeting, North Korea would not engage seriously in talks until it knew exactly what kind of benefits it would receive for giving up its only claim to power, and its only leverage. For his part of the long stalemate, Mr. Bush refused to give in to what he once called "nuclear blackmail."

But by this spring, pressure on the White House had risen. A group of American visitors to North Korea's main nuclear complex reported that 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods — all placed under seal by the International Atomic Energy Agency before its inspectors were expelled 18 months ago — were gone. American intelligence agencies, while disagreeing about the details, concluded that most or all had been converted to bomb fuel, if not actual weapons.

"You could argue about the numbers," said Robert L. Gallucci, the chief American negotiator for the 1994 nuclear accord with North Korea that the Bush administration dismisses as a flawed start, "but not the direction."

South Korea, pressing to engage North Korea, began negotiating aid packages and military agreements. China reportedly paid North Korea millions of dollars just to come to the negotiating table, and publicly began questioning the validity of some of Washington's intelligence about North Korea's second nuclear program. That program was created with help from the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

And Senator John Kerry, the presumptive Democratic nominee, was beginning to charge that Mr. Bush had made America significantly less safe by ignoring the growing North Korean arsenal while it was focused on Iraq. "That was noticed in the White House," one senior State Department official said.

The turning point came in the past two weeks. Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, returned from a meeting with Mr. Kim, whom he had paid handsomely for releasing the relatives of Japanese kidnapped by North Korea years ago.

"I told him face to face, 'If you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons and what you gain from dismantlement of your own nuclear program, there would be a difference of heaven and earth,' " Mr. Koizumi told reporters later. At the summit meeting at Sea Island, Ga., earlier this month, Mr. Koizumi told Mr. Bush that he felt the North Korean leader might be serious about making a deal.

Mr. Bush's critics say he waited far too long to make his offer; Mr. Kerry argues it should have happened early in 2001, and others say right after the American invasion of Iraq. Hawks inside the administration believe it is still too early.

But China, Russia, South Korea and Japan said they were willing to provide North Korea with fuel oil, which the United States cut off a year and a half ago, forcing Mr. Bush's hand.

The question now is whether the North Koreans will decide to await the outcome of the presidential election.

The American proposal will not end the old debates. A North Korean agreement to full disclosure and dismantlement, including giving up all fissile material, would prompt a "provisional" security guarantee promising that the United States and its allies harbor "no intention to invade or attack."

But that is different, some hawks are already arguing, than committing never to seek regime change inside a country run by a leader Mr. Bush once said he detested.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/politics/24ASSE.html>

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Washington Technology

06/23/04

Battelle gets \$20 million to build protection dem.

BY Brad Grimes

STAFF WRITER

Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio, has won a two-year, \$20 million contract from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to demonstrate solutions for keeping buildings safe in the event of a biological or chemical attack, the company said.

The demonstration phase of the Immune Building program is the project's third phase. Battelle also participated in the first two phases.

As lead integrator, Battelle will manage the design, testing and evaluation, implementation and final demonstration of a complete building protection system.

"The innovative advancements in building protection resulting from the Immune Building program will be vital to defending Americans in the global war against terrorism," said Michael Janus, director of building protection at Battelle.

DARPA's Immune Building program began in 2001 to identify solutions for protecting building occupants, restoring operations and collecting forensic evidence in a chemical or biological event.

During the first two phases, Battelle's team identified protective technologies by modeling the effect of chemical and biological agents on different building types. The team then created a test facility at Fort McClellan, Ala.

According to Battelle officials, the team will refine and modify the test bed, then transfer the design to a facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. Eventually, Battelle will turn over an operational Immune Building to the Army.

Battelle's team for the demonstration phase includes Black and Veatch Inc., Mechanical Engineering and Construction Corp. and Clark Atlanta University.

With 16,000 employees, Battelle develops technology and manages laboratories for the government. The non-profit company had 2003 revenue of \$1.3 billion and ranks No. 35 on Washington Technology's 2004 Top 100 list, which measures federal contracting revenue.

http://www.wtonline.com/news/1_1/daily_news/23855-1.html

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Washington Post

June 25, 2004

Pg. 1

Iran Says It Will Renew Nuclear Efforts

By Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer

Iran made good on recent threats yesterday and announced that it will resume building equipment essential for a nuclear weapons program, despite its agreement with three major European powers.

The decision does not violate international treaties that allow Tehran to make centrifuge parts for peaceful nuclear energy. But the move does break an agreement Iran signed with France, Britain and Germany, in which it promised to suspend nuclear efforts as a goodwill gesture toward earning trade incentives with the European Union.

European officials and arms-control specialists called Iran's move a major setback and a reflection of the difficulties faced by those working to check Iran's nuclear ambitions as evidence mounts that the country is concealing information from international inspectors.

John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control, told Congress that Iran's move is a "thumb in the eye of the international community." Bolton said the United States is determined to take the matter soon to the U.N. Security Council.

Iranian officials, who threatened to restart nuclear programs in response to a harsh rebuke last week by the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency, insisted their efforts remain peaceful.

"We assure European countries Iran is not searching for nuclear weapons, but we will never abandon nuclear technology and the mastery of this science," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's top leader, said in a statement.

In a letter to the French, British and German foreign ministers, Iran said it will resume centrifuge production -- a move that would bring the country a significant step closer to making highly explosive nuclear material.

"All Iran would have to do now is put uranium into the centrifuges, and then they can start producing a key ingredient for nuclear weapons," said David Albright, a former nuclear inspector.

In diplomatic terms, Iran's defiance was seen as a direct challenge to the United States, which is trying to convince allies that it is time to punish Iran at the Security Council.

U.S. and European officials, working in concert, claimed a victory last week when the International Atomic Energy Agency's 35-member board censured Iran for failing to comply fully with agency inspectors trying to determine whether the country is hiding a weapons program.

The board asked Iran to stop all enrichment production and to reconsider design and construction of a heavy-water nuclear reactor. In the past 18 months, inspectors have uncovered an escalating series of contradictions in Iranian

statements, along with evidence that nuclear specialists consider strongly suggestive of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, as the United States has asserted.

European allies do not disagree with the assessments but believe that diplomatic incentives could help persuade Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. The Bush administration has taken a tougher line, but at the same time it has supported the Europeans in their approach.

Iran was initially responsive, and in April it halted centrifuge construction. But it has since accused Germany, Britain and France of reneging on their promise to help end the matter within the IAEA.

Yesterday, diplomats conceded that Iran's latest move had thrown their efforts into doubt.

"This is certainly a negative development," said one European diplomat, who acknowledged that the deal is now in serious jeopardy.

Albright, who revealed satellite images last week showing newly destroyed Iranian facilities, said: "The whole program to suspend ways to enrich uranium is unraveling, and unless it's put back together again, the international community will come under pressure to isolate Iran and impose economic sanctions."

In remarks to the House International Relations subcommittee on the Middle East, Bolton said the United States believes that Iran is also working on biological and chemical weapons programs.

The State Department is searching shipments to Iran for material that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction, Bolton said later yesterday to the American Enterprise Institute.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3921-2004Jun24.html>

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Washington Times

June 25, 2004

Pg. 3

Iraqi Insurgents Seek Saddam's Chemical Arms

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

Insurgents in Iraq are seeking chemical arms and expertise left over from the regime of Saddam Hussein for possible use against U.S. and allied troops, an intelligence official in Iraq said yesterday.

Charles Deulfer, the head of the CIA weapons inspection team, also said in a television interview that weapons searchers so far have found as many as a dozen chemical-filled bombs.

"What we are finding is that there are some networks that are seeking to tap into ... this expertise, and try to use it against the United States," Mr. Deulfer told Fox News Channel's Brit Hume. "And we are very concerned about that. That is a problem."

Mr. Deulfer said that investigations into arms laboratories in Iraq and interviews with former Iraqi arms specialists revealed that "former experts in the WMD program are being recruited by anticoalition groups."

"They are being paid by anticoalition groups," he said. "We're seeing interest in developing chemical munitions." Asked whether anything suggests that insurgents actually are getting the expertise or may be ready to use it, Mr. Deulfer said: "We want to follow that very, very closely."

Of particular concern is the danger that al Qaeda associate Abu Musab Zarqawi will acquire and use chemical weapons.

Zarqawi "is one bad actor, and if he gets his hands on it, he'll use it," Mr. Deulfer said.

U.S. intelligence officials have identified the Jordanian-born Islamist as the leader of the foreign insurgents in Iraq fighting U.S., Iraqi and allied forces and engaging in attacks on civilians.

Zarqawi is known to be a specialist in bomb making and also is believed to have some expertise in chemical weapons, according to U.S. officials.

The wave of bombings and shootings in Iraq that killed at least 100 people yesterday is believed to be the work of the Zarqawi terrorist network, which officials estimate has between several hundred to several thousand fighters operating undercover.

On the chemical munitions, Mr. Deulfer, who replaced David Kay as the head of the Iraq Survey Group earlier this year, said that the group has uncovered 10 to 12 bombs filled with blistering mustard gas or the nerve agent sarin.

"We're not sure how many more are out there that haven't been found, but we've found 10 or 12 sarin and mustard rounds," he said. "I'm reluctant to judge what that means at this point, but there's other aspects of the program which we still have to flush out."

U.S. military officials in Baghdad found two bombs in May containing chemicals. A roadside bomb made from an artillery shell discovered May 15 contained chemicals that, when combined, form sarin.

Earlier on May 7, another improvised explosive device was found containing mustard agent.

All such weapons were supposed to have been destroyed by Saddam's regime under U.N. sanctions and the terms of the cease fire from the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war.

Officials said the chemical munitions were probably stored with conventional arms in some of the thousands of weapons depots located throughout Iraq. Military officials have uncovered some 8,700 weapons depots and continue to find new ones, and estimate that the weapons depots in Iraq contain between 650,000 and 1 million tons of arms. The dumps are believed to be arming the anticolonial insurgency as former regime elements and terrorists join forces in conducting attacks.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040624-112920-5897r.htm>

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Washington Times

June 25, 2004

Pg. 4

Clinton First Linked Al Qaeda To Saddam

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Clinton administration talked about firm evidence linking Saddam Hussein's regime to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network years before President Bush made the same statements.

The issue arose again this month after the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States reported there was no "collaborative relationship" between the old Iraqi regime and bin Laden.

Democrats have cited the staff report to accuse Mr. Bush of making inaccurate statements about a linkage.

Commission members, including a Democrat and two Republicans, quickly came to the administration's defense by saying there had been such contacts.

In fact, during President Clinton's eight years in office, there were at least two official pronouncements of an alarming alliance between Baghdad and al Qaeda. One came from William S. Cohen, Mr. Clinton's defense secretary. He cited an al Qaeda-Baghdad link to justify the bombing of a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.

Mr. Bush cited the linkage, in part, to justify invading Iraq and ousting Saddam. He said he could not take the risk of Iraq's weapons falling into bin Laden's hands.

The other pronouncement is contained in a Justice Department indictment on Nov. 4, 1998, charging bin Laden with murder in the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa.

The indictment disclosed a close relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam's regime, which included specialists on chemical weapons and all types of bombs, including truck bombs, a favorite weapon of terrorists.

The 1998 indictment said: "Al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with the government of Iran and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States. In addition, al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq."

Shortly after the embassy bombings, Mr. Clinton ordered air strikes on al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and on the Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.

To justify the Sudanese plant as a target, Clinton aides said it was involved in the production of deadly VX nerve gas. Officials further determined that bin Laden owned a stake in the operation and that its manager had traveled to Baghdad to learn bomb-making techniques from Saddam's weapons scientists.

Mr. Cohen elaborated in March in testimony before the September 11 commission.

He testified that "bin Laden had been living [at the plant], that he had, in fact, money that he had put into this military industrial corporation, that the owner of the plant had traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of the VX program."

He said that if the plant had been allowed to produce VX that was used to kill thousands of Americans, people would have asked him, "You had a manager that went to Baghdad; you had Osama bin Laden, who had funded, at least the corporation, and you had traces of [VX precursor] and you did what? And you did nothing?" Is that a responsible activity on the part of the secretary of defense?"

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040624-112921-3401r.htm>

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U.S. Meets With N. Korea Over Nuclear Program

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. and North Korean officials met yesterday for 2 1/2 hours on the sidelines of six-nation talks in Beijing, the longest meeting between senior officials of the two nations since the crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions began 20 months ago.

U.S. officials stressed that the discussions were not negotiations or even bilateral, because the contents of the discussions were immediately shared with delegations from the other countries at the talks: South Korea, Japan, China and Russia.

But the length of the private session -- when the Bush administration is under attack by Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry for not having direct talks -- indicated the administration is more willing to engage directly with the North Koreans.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is considering a brief meeting with his North Korean counterpart when both attend a regional conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, next week, officials said.

The North Korean delegation, still awaiting instructions from Pyongyang, was not prepared yesterday to respond in detail to the more specific proposal advanced by the administration on the opening day of the talks Wednesday, U.S. officials said. The administration offered North Korea the possibility of energy aid from South Korea, security assurances and other benefits during a three-month test period if it promises to disclose and end its nuclear weapons programs.

In a plenary session Wednesday, North Korea reiterated its demands for significant aid in exchange for freezing its plutonium program. North Korea also again denied it has a secret uranium-enrichment program, as alleged by the United States.

During the private session, the North Korean officials described the revised U.S. plan as a "constructive proposal," according to a White House official speaking under the condition of anonymity. The North Koreans then asked a few questions before reverting to what the official called the "same-old, same-old" complaints about the administration's "hostile policy."

At one point, officials said, North Korean officials appeared to raise the possibility of testing a nuclear device, a threat made at the first six-nation talks last August. North Korean officials had not repeated the threat since, in part because the U.S. delegation immediately reported it to the other delegations.

According to the White House official, the North Koreans offered to freeze all of their country's activities, including testing nuclear weapons.

But when the Americans asked whether Pyongyang is planning to test its weapons, the North Koreans backed away from the statement, he said. The officials, from the North Korean Foreign Ministry, suggested they had little control over the wishes of the North Korean military, who they added want to test and test soon.

Another senior U.S. official briefed on the talks said that James Kelly, the chief U.S. negotiator, responded that North Korea already does not have much trust in Washington and that its performance in the meeting would only worsen the impression.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4190-2004Jun24.html>

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Nuclear Ring May Have Aided Syria

U.S. data signal the presence of centrifuges. Atomic agency wants to know if Damascus was Pakistani expert's client.

By Douglas Frantz, Times Staff Writer

International investigators are examining whether Syria acquired nuclear technology and expertise through the black market network operated by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, according to a U.S. official and Western diplomats.

Intelligence reports indicate that Khan and some associates visited Syria in the late 1990s and later held clandestine meetings with Syrian nuclear officials in Iran, the diplomats said.

Concerns were heightened after an experimental U.S. electronic eavesdropping device recently picked up signals indicating that Syria was operating centrifuges, which enrich uranium for possible use in nuclear weapons. Khan, who helped Pakistan develop its nuclear arsenal, has admitted selling advanced centrifuge technology and expertise to Iran, Libya and North Korea over nearly two decades. The extent of his illicit operations remains unknown, but diplomats said that if Syria did have centrifuges they would undoubtedly have come from Khan's network.

Inspectors from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, are investigating whether sales were made to other countries as they try to build an accurate picture of what officials consider the most serious nuclear proliferation network in history.

A senior European diplomat familiar with the IAEA inquiry said Syria was on the list of suspected customers, but he said the agency had not found evidence that Khan visited Syria or sold technology to it.

The IAEA declined to comment, and a spokeswoman for the U.S. State Department said, "We are unable to comment on any of these questions, because they are all of an intelligence nature." The Syrian representative to the IAEA in Vienna did not respond to written questions submitted Tuesday. In the past, Syrian officials have dismissed accusations that the country is pursuing nuclear weapons.

Other Western diplomats and some U.S. officials cautioned that the information linking Syria to Khan's network was not conclusive. Even if Khan had contact with Syria, they said, there was no evidence that Damascus bought centrifuges or other technology from him.

Since admitting his dealings with some countries this year, Khan has been cooperating with Pakistani authorities, who are sharing some information with the IAEA and the United States.

Khan did not deny contacts with other governments, a senior U.S. official said, but the Pakistani scientist said sales were made only to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Khan's network involved middlemen and suppliers in Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The network offered advanced centrifuge machines, components and designs as well as training for operating the machines. Libya also acquired blueprints for a nuclear bomb.

The ring was exposed this year, after Libya turned over Pakistani-supplied centrifuge components and related documents as part of an agreement brokered by the U.S. and Britain to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Even before the scope of Khan's operations became public, the CIA raised alarms about Syria's alleged interest in nuclear weapons and hinted that the nation might be trying to buy technology on the black market.

"Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern," the agency said in a report submitted to Congress in mid-2003. Syria maintains one of the region's largest arsenals of ballistic missiles, developed in cooperation with North Korea and other countries. Analysts also believe that Syria possesses chemical and biological weapons.

The information about its possible nuclear ambitions is more vague. The Western diplomats who described the links between Syria and Khan's network said the Pakistani scientist gave several lectures on nuclear materials in late 1997 and early 1998 in Damascus. Beginning in 2001, they said, Khan's meetings with the Syrians were held in Iran because Syria was concerned that its contacts with the Pakistani scientist would be exposed. They said three scientists from Khan's research laboratory in Pakistan accompanied him to Iran.

The diplomats said the meetings were part of a program intended to help Syria develop nuclear weapons.

The diplomats spoke on condition that neither they nor their countries be identified because of the sensitive nature of the information and the means used to gather it.

Centrifuges spin at enormous speeds to transform uranium gas into enriched uranium for use in reactors or bombs. Thousands of machines are necessary to produce large amounts of enriched uranium, but even a small number would give off a distinct signal, experts said.

The senior U.S. official, who also insisted on anonymity, said an experimental electronic monitor had picked up the distinctive pattern of centrifuges operating in Syria in recent months. The official did not provide any details and said the U.S. only suspects that the technology came from Khan's network.

Reuters news agency reported in early May that the U.S. had information that Syria was operating centrifuges. But the report said the Bush administration was divided over the accuracy of the information.

Some administration officials have pushed for tough action against Syria because of its alleged ties to extremists and likely pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Other officials have argued for a softer course because Damascus has cooperated on terrorism issues.

Under pressure from Congress, President Bush applied economic sanctions on Syria on May 11 because of what he said was its support of terrorism and interference in U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syrianukes25jun25,1,3658911.story?coll=la-home-world>

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New York Times

Iran and North Korea Reignite Fears on Atomic Programs

By DAVID E. SANGER

Published: June 25, 2004

WASHINGTON, June 24 — Iran and North Korea made separate announcements on Thursday that spurred concern that they are headed to confrontations with the United States over their nuclear programs.

European nations said they had received a diplomatic note from Iran saying it would resume manufacturing equipment for its nuclear centrifuges, but not resuming uranium enrichment.

"They've sent letters saying we haven't lived up to our commitments to normalize relations," said a spokesman for Britain, which received the note, along with France and Germany.

"Among Europeans and the U.S., there will be deep disappointment," he added. "There is no good reason for it. Europe will be urging them to reverse this decision."

The note was interpreted by American officials in Washington as a sign that Tehran had chosen to defy the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose board passed a resolution last Friday sharply critical of Iran's efforts to hide important segments of its program from the agency's inspectors.

It is not clear, in any case, that Iran has ever halted all its centrifuge production.

In Beijing, North Korean negotiators told their American counterparts that the North Korean Army was threatening to test a nuclear weapon. According to American officials who reviewed notes from their counterparts at the Beijing talks, the North Koreans did not reject outright a new proposal by the Bush administration that would tie nuclear dismantling to carefully calibrated aid from American allies.

One official said: "They seem to be waiting for instructions from Kim Jong Il," the North Korean leader. "So this may have been a real threat. But it was probably a stalling action."

The talks, which include China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, are widely expected to run at least through Friday. North Korea has made such threats at least once before, in a previous round of talks. American and Asian officials say China has warned North Korea that a nuclear test could turn its neighbors against it.

At the same time, such a test would remove any doubt that North Korea has nuclear ability.

The Iranian note was sent to Britain, France and Germany, the three nations that intervened in the fall to try to defuse a confrontation with the I.A.E.A. over inspections. Iran said it was no longer committed to a promise to halt work on the centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium, either for commercial power production or because Europe had failed to close the questions surrounding the inspection by June.

The existence of the note was announced by John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control, in testimony before a Congressional subcommittee.

The Iranian statement stopped short of declaring that it would use its existing set of centrifuges to manufacture uranium, though the international agency has evidence of past production.

Iran has insisted that its entire program is aimed at generating electricity, but it has yet to explain why it hid many complexes for years or why inspectors had detected uranium enriched to levels far beyond what is needed for commercial purposes.

Mr. Bolton, who has formulated much of the strategy to isolate Iran, told the subcommittee on Thursday that Iran's stance was not credible.

"Our view is that Iran is still pursuing a strategic decision to have a nuclear weapons capability," he said. "This is not something that is accidental. It goes to a core of the strategy."

"What we have to do is change that strategic decision one way or another. Our goal is not to delay that, but to stop it."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/25/politics/25NUKE.html>

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